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INTRODUCTION
If the rule of law is to be fully implemented at the international
level, the subjects of international law must have faith in the judiciary. If
judges are not able to make clear pronouncements as to what the law is,
actors will hesitate to bring future disputes to international courts for
binding decisions. Even if most ingredients required to ensure full re-
spect for the rule of law are present internationally, international judges
may limit its effectiveness by planting doubts into the minds of subjects
of international law. It then falls to the presiding judge of an interna-
tional court to ensure that-as guardian of the judicial tradition of that
court-any pronouncement made garners the respect of the international
community and is seen as being authoritative.
The judgment of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
(ITLOS) in the M/V Saiga case related to prompt release is indicative.
When rendering its first ever judgment, the Tribunal voted twelve to
* Assistant Professor of Public International Law, Department of Political Science,
The American University in Cairo, Egypt.
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nine to order the release by Guinea of a tanker flying the flag of Saint
Vincent. The failure of the President of the ITLOS to forge a strong ma-
jority for this first case puts in peril the future of the Law of the Sea
Tribunal. It will become evident that the President's failure to ensure a
clear pronouncement on the law undermines the very legitimacy of this
judicial organ.
The following study considers the role that should be assumed by a
presiding judge to ensure full respect for the rule of law internationally.
The foundation for this study lies in an examination of the dispute set-
tlement provisions of the Law of the Sea Convention as well as its
mechanism for the settlement of disputes-the International Tribunal for
the Law of the Sea. The Tribunal was called upon to deliver judgment in
the MIV Saiga case. The judgment, along with the primary dissenting
opinion, are considered, compared, and analyzed in order to demon-
strate the extent to which the judgment is, as one commentator put it,
"disappointing in quality and marred by serious error."' Following this
assessment, the role of the President of the ITLOS is examined so as to
establish that the holder of this position is primus super pares, and, as
such, has the ability to influence the process of deliberation. Finally, the
proposition is made that the President of the ITLOS had a responsibility
to attempt to forge both a strong majority and a well-reasoned judgment,
but failed to do so by not leading ITLOS through the most crucial stage
of deliberations.
I. DISPUTE SETTLEMENT WITHIN THE
LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION
The coming into force of the Untied Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea on 16 November 1994 must be considered a significant mile-
stone in the evolution of international relations.2 Not only has the
Convention established an overall legal framework governing two-thirds
of the surface of the globe; it has instituted a regime which makes "an
enduring contribution to a new structure for peaceful relations among
1. E. D. Brown, The MV 'Saiga' Case on Prompt Release of Detained Vessels: The
First Judgment of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, 22 MARINE POLICY 307,
325 (1998).
2. U.N. CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, 1982, U.N. Text, U.N. Sales No.
E.83.V.5 (1983) [hereinafter LOS CONVENTION]. As of January 2001, there were 135 States
parties to the Convention. For the most up-to-date information regarding the LOS Conven-
tion, see the website of the UN Division of Ocean Affairs and Law of the Sea at
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/index.htm.
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States."3 That contribution-a system which institutes a compulsory set-
tlement system for some types of disputes-is so central to the
effectiveness of the law of the sea regime that "nearly a quarter of the
Convention's articles are devoted to disputes settlement."4 Dispute set-
tlement within the LOS Convention is predicated upon a number of
basic principles. From these principles emerges a complex regime meant
to turn its philosophical underpinnings into applicable provisions.
Part XV of the LOS Convention sets out these principles, which are
meant to govern States' actions in situations where a dispute arises.
First, Part XV ensures that the Convention is consistent with the UN
Charter's dispute settlement obligations. That is to say, States are re-
quired to settle their disputes by peaceful means. The first provision of
Part XV, Article 279, makes this clear as it refers to States' obligation
under Article 2(3) of the UN Charter to "settle their international dis-
putes by peaceful means" and to seek such solutions by the modes
indicated in Article 33(1) of the Charter.6 The second governing element
requires that when a dispute arises, States should first seek to avoid in-
voking the third-party dispute settlement machinery of the Convention
and attempt to settle their differences through negotiation. This princi-
ple, first posited by Professor Eli Lauterpacht at the 1975 Geneva
Session of the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III),'
finds expression in the Convention under Article 283 which makes it
obligatory for the parties to exchange views once a dispute has arisen.
3. Louis B. Sohn, Settlement of Disputes Arising Out of the Law of the Sea Convention,
12 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 495, 516-17 n. 62 (1975)(quoting United States Ambassador John R.
Stevenson). Stevenson discussed the objectives of the LOS Convention some ten years ear-
lier. Of interest here may be the fact that the United States was on board very early when it
came to compulsory settlement within the framework of the law of the sea. Also note US
President Richard Nixon's statement in 1970 to the effect that "peaceful and compulsory
settlement of disputes" is one of the important purposes of the sea-bed regime. Louis B.
Sohn, A Tribunal for the Sea-Bed and the Oceans, 32 ZEITSCHRIFr FUR AUSLANDISCHES 6F-
FENTLISCHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT 253, 254 (1972).
4. Tono Eitel, The Law of the Sea Tribunal: Its Status and Scope of Jurisdiction after
November 16, 1994, 55 ZEITSCHRIFr FUR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLISCHES RECHT UND
VOLKERRECHT 452, 456 (1995) (Comment). The central nature of obligatory dispute settle-
ment within the LOS Convention indicated a marked progress in the evolution of dispute
settlement within the regime of the law of the sea. In the 1958 LOS Conventions, dispute
settlement was relegated to the Optional Protocol of Signature concerning the Compulsory
Settlement of Disputes of the same date. See U.N. GAOR, 1st Conf., Law of the Sea, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.13/38 (1958).
5. For the provisions of Part XV, see LOS CONVENTION, supra note 2.
6. The modes of dispute settlement found in Article 33(1) are "negotiation, inquiry,
mediation, conciliation, arbitration, or judicial settlement." U.N. CHARTER art. 33, para. 1.
See ERIC SuY, CORPUS IURIS GENTIUM, at 13-33 (1996).
7. A.O. Adede, Prolegomena to the Disputes Settlement Part of the Law of the Sea
Convention, 10 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 253, 262 (1977).
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The third guiding principle of dispute settlement is that States are free to
choose the means of dispute settlement, whether within the framework
of the Convention or by recourse to outside agreements.8 The ability of
States to choose their forum9 constitutes the object of Article 287(1),
which allows States to select from the following:
(a) the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea established
in accordance with Annex VI;
(b) the International Court of Justice;
(c) an arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex
VII;
(d) a special arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with
Annex VIII for one or more of the categories of disputes
specified therein.'0
The final overarching principle governing the framework to the Law
of the Sea Convention generally requires that States should settle their
disputes by means of compulsory procedures which include binding
decisions. From the very early stages of the UNCLOS III negotiations,
there was a call for a regime dealing with the law of the sea which in-
cluded obligatory settlement of disputes. Towards the end of the 1974
Caracas session of UNCLOS III, a working paper on dispute settlement
was presented to delegations which contained provisions calling for an
"obligation to resort to a means of settlement resulting in a binding de-
cision."" Professor Louis B. Sohn, one of the drafters of the working
paper, argued:
[for] many countries, the adjustments made for the sake of ob-
taining an agreement on the law of the sea are justifiable only if
sufficient means are provided to avoid the political, economic
and even military confrontations which might otherwise occur.
8. See LOS CONVENTION, supra note 2, arts. 280, 282.
9. The genesis of the principle of allowing States the greatest freedom in determining
the means of dispute settlement within the framework of the LOS Conventions can be traced
to the "Montreux formula" which resulted from a suggestion by Professor Riphagen, at the
1975 Geneva Session, that States could be called upon to make a declaration when ratifying
the Convention as to which forum they preferred. For a mention of Riphagen's contribution,
see Louis B. Sohn, Towards a Tribunal for the Oceans, 5-6 IRANIAN REV. OF INT'L REL.
254-257 (1975-76); for a discussion relating to the Montreux formula, see Adede, supra
note 7, at 258, 272, 385; see also Shabtai Rosenne, The Settlement of Disputes in the New
Law of the Sea, 11-12 IRANIAN REV. OF INT'L REL. 415 (1978).
10. LOS CONVENTION, supra note 2, art. 287.
11. See U.N. GAOR U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/1.7 (1974), reprinted in A.O. ADEDE, THE
SYSTEM FOR SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE
LAW OF THE SEA: A DRAFTING HISTORY AND A COMMENTARY 16 (1987).
[Vol. 22:391
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The stability of the new regime for the oceans, which is likely to
encompass many novel principles and institutions, will depend
to a large extent on the establishment and effective functioning
of the dispute settlement procedures.'
2
Building on this point, Sohn noted in retrospect that "it was recognized
early in the negotiations that if the parties to the Convention had re-
tained the right of unilateral interpretation, then the complex text drafted
by the Conference would have lacked stability, certainty, and predict-
ability."' 3 However, it was conceded in the working paper that not all
disputes arising from the application or interpretation of the Convention
would be susceptible to obligatory settlement.
The basic principle of obligatory settlement was included in the
Convention through a complex.system enumerating those disputes that
require settlement by recourse to compulsory procedures entailing bind-
ing decisions. At the same time, the Convention establishes limitations
and optional exceptions to such procedures.' 4 In situations where dis-
putes arise, States have an obligation, under Section 1, to seek
settlement by peaceful means. If they cannot reach agreement-
having exchanged views on the matter and having failed to agree to
conciliation' 5-the parties may unilaterally invoke the procedures of
the Convention entailing binding decisions. These procedures, found
in Section 2 of Part XV of the Convention, require States to choose
from the above noted four adjudicative means of Article 287. If the
parties to the dispute disagree as to the forum, or have failed to make a
declaration choosing a forum, the dispute will be settled by an ad hoc
arbitral tribunal.
6
An adjudicative organ selected under the purview of Article 287 has
jurisdiction "over any dispute concerning the interpretation or
application" of the LOS Convention or any other international
agreement related to it. This general jurisdiction established by Article
288(1) and (2) is, however, subject to the limitations imposed by Section
3 of Part XV. General limitations on the scope of obligatory settlement
are introduced at Article 297. This Article limits the applicability of the
system by excluding the following domains: the exercise of its sovereign
rights or jurisdiction by a coastal State; marine scientific research; and
12. Sohn, supra note 9, at 258-259.
13. Louis B. Sohn, Peaceful Settlement of Disputes in Ocean Conflicts: Does UNCLOS
IlI Point the Way?, 46 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 195 (1983).
14. See LOS CONVENTION, supra note 2, Part XV, § 3.
15. See id. art. 284 (dealing with conciliation); see generally, id. Part XV, § 1.
16. See id. art. 287, §§ 3, 5. Note, however, that in the original Caracas working paper it
was the Law of the Sea Tribunal and not an arbitration panel which was the residual forum in
situations where there was no agreement or declaration under Article 287.
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fisheries. 7 Beyond these limitations granted as a right, States have the
option, under Article 298, to declare further exceptions to the
compulsory procedures entailing binding decisions. States, when
ratifying the LOS Convention, are allowed to make a declaration to the
effect that they do not accept the binding procedure for any or all of the
following categories:
1) disputes over sea boundary delimitation or historic bays or
titles;
2) disputes concerning military activities, including military
activities and disputes concerning law enforcement activi-
ties in exercise of sovereign rights or jurisdiction excluded
from the jurisdiction of a court or tribunal under article
297(2) or 297 (3);
3) disputes in respect of which the Security Council is exercis-
ing the functions assigned to it by the United Nations
Charter. "
The fact that States are exempt from utilizing the binding mechanism to
settle their disputes with respect to situations arising out of Article 297,
or for which they have opted out of via the provisions of Article 298,
does not mean that they are excused from attempting to seek a resolu-
tion to their dispute under the LOS Convention. On the contrary, States,
regardless of the nature of their dispute, must meet obligations set out in
Section 1. These obligations may well settle their disputes per the bind-
ing system. However, this may only take place with the consent of the
parties.
Beyond the general jurisdiction attributed to adjudicative organs by
Article 288, the Convention provides for two specific situations where
an adjudicative organ will have additional powers to make a determina-
tion leading to a binding decision. Under Article 290, adjudicative
organs will have the power to prescribe provisional measures to preserve
the rights of the parties pending a decision.' 9 Further, under Article 292,
17. For the confusing nature of Article 297, see E. D. Brown, Dispute Settlement and the
Law of the Sea: the UN Convention Regime, 21 MARINE POLICY 21-23 (1997). Article 297
outlines in subsection (1) the items that fall within the purview of Section 2, thus leaving the
reader to determine what items within the domain of the exercise of the sovereign rights or
jurisdiction of a coastal State are to be exempt from obligatory jurisdiction. Then, in Article
297(2) and (3), the logic is reverse: those elements which are to be excepted from the con-
siderations of Section 2 are outlined.
18. Id. at 23.
19. Thus, in a case where the International Court of Justice was the forum of choice, its
incidental jurisdiction to indicate provisional measures under Article 41 of its Statute would
be upgraded from being simply declarative to being binding on the parties. For the provi-
[Vol. 22:391
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an adjudicative organ determined by Article 287 is granted jurisdiction
in cases where it is alleged that a State is detaining a ship flying another
State's flag in contravention of the Convention's provisions regarding
prompt release. In these situations of prompt release and provisional
measures, the ITLOS is ascribed a residual role; it has jurisdiction
when, after less than a fortnight, the parties have failed to reach agree-
ment on an adjudicative forum.
II. THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL
FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA
The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea "is unique in that the
mechanism for the settlement of disputes is incorporated into the docu-
ment."2° The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, established
by Annex VI of the LOS Convention, was inaugurated on 18 October
1996 in Hamburg, Germany.2' The establishment of this international
judicial body can be attributed not only to the UN Convention on the
Law of the Sea, which grants jurisdiction to the adjudicative organs
mentioned in Article 287 over disputes involving States, but also to "the
International Seabed Authority, companies and private individuals., 22 As
such, it was considered necessary to establish an international judicial
organ which could be acceded to by various subjects of international
law. For this reason, it was clear that the International Court of Justice,
with its jurisdiction being ratione personae limited to States by Article
34(1) of its Statute, would not be suitable for the purposes of the LOS
Convention.23
sions on Dispute Settlement, see LOS CONVENTION, supra note 2, Part XV. For the Statute of
the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, see LOS CONVENTION, supra note 2, An-
nex VI.
20. Press Release, Int'l Trib. for the Law of the Sea, Ceremonial Inauguration of the
Judges of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. ITLOS/Press 2 (Oct.
18, 1996) at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/Press/ITLOS/ITLOS-2.html.
21. For the provisions of Annex VI, see LOS CONVENTION, supra note 2, Annex VI.
22. Press Release, Int'l Trib. for the Law of the Sea, Election of Mr. Gritakumar Chitty
as the first registrar of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 2, U.N. Doc.
ITLOS/Press 3 (October 23, 1996) at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/Press/ITLOS/ITLOS-
3.html.
23. See Sohn, A Tribunal for the Sea-Bed and the Oceans, supra note 3, at 258; see also
Sohn supra note 9, at 248. Arguments have also been made that the establishment of the
ITLOS was a response to the failings of the ICJ during the 1960s (South-West Africa case)
and "an oblique response to the decline in the use of States of the ICJ" during the 1970s. See
A. R. Carnegie, The Law of the Sea Tribunal, 28 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 669, 683 (1979).
Further, it was left to Judge Shigeru Oda to proffer the following justification for the
establishment of the ITLOS: "Furthermore, it is regrettable that the idea of the ITLOS seems
to have been reinforced by the personal desires of some delegates to UNCLOS III and the
Spring 20011]
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The Tribunal is made up of 21 independent judges24 with a recog-
nized competence in the field of the law of the sea who are meant both
to encompass the principal legal systems of the world and to reflect an
equitable geographic distribution in its membership. 25 By virtue of Arti-
cle 4(3) of the Statute, the Tribunal should have held the first election of
judges on 16 May 1995, six months after the Convention went into
force. Yet, in a meeting of the State Parties to the Convention held in
1994, it was decided that this election should be deferred three months,
until 1 August 1996. According to E.D. Brown, Director of the Centre
for Marine Law and Policy at the University of Wales, this was meant to
give more States the opportunity to "become Parties to the UN Conven-
tion and thus qualify to take part in the election. 26 By election time, one
hundred States, including strong representation from all geographic ar-
27eas and legal systems, were Parties to the Convention.
The Tribunal has jurisdiction over "all disputes and applications
submitted to it"'28 either within the framework of the LOS Convention
or by virtue of any other instrument giving it jurisdiction. Further, the
Tribunal is granted jurisdiction over the interpretation and application of
other treaties concerning the subject-matter of the LOS Convention.
Preparatory Commission and other jurists, who appear to have been personally interested in
obtaining posts in international judicial organs." See Shigeru Oda, Dispute Settlement
Prospects in the Law of the Sea, 4 INT'L & COMP. L. Q., 863, 865 (1995). Note also that
Judge Oda states that he may well have focused too much on "the rather negative aspects of
the provisions of Part XV of the Convention and the futility of the ITLOS in particular." Id.
at 871. Questionable as Judge Oda's statement may be, it appears that his observations were
correct: the ITLOS reported that "[t]he Judges were elected among experts in the law of the
sea, many of whom have been involved in negotiating the Convention." Press Release, Int'l
Trib. for the Law of the Sea, Election of the President and Vice-President of the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 2, U.N. Doc. ITLOS/Press 1 (Oct. 5 1996) at http://
www.un.org/Depts/los/Press/ITLOSITLOS- I .html.
24. With respect to the independence of the ITLOS judges, consider the following:
The interval between the election on 1 August 1996 and 1 October 1996 enabled
those members of the Tribunal concerned to disengage themselves from incom-
patible activities and financial interest, in accordance with Article 7 of the Statute.
In its interim report, of 1996, the Tribunal reported that it had agreed on general
guidelines to assist the judges in determining which activities might be undertaken
by them.
Shabtai Rosenne, International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea: 1996-97 Survey, 13 INT'L J.
OF MARINE AND COASTAL L. 487, 497 (1998). See generally Jean Allain, Judicial Independ-
ence in Practice: The Case of Judge Odio Benito, Vice-President of Costa Rica, 77(1) REVUE
DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL DE SCIENCE DIPLOMATIQUES ET POLITIQUES I, 1-22 (1999).
25. See LOS CONVENTION, supra note 2, Annex VI, art. 2.
26. Brown, supra note 17, at 35.
27. Rosenne, supra note 24, at 491. It was agreed by State Parties that the composition
of the Tribunal should be as follows: five judges from Africa; five from Asia; four from Latin
America and the Caribbean; three from Eastern Europe; and four from Western Europe and
other States. See id.
28. LOS CONVENTION, supra note 2, Annex VI, art. 21.
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However, such jurisdiction is only attainable in the rare circumstance, at
least in the realm of multilateral organizations, where all parties agree to
make reference to the Tribunal." Besides the jurisdiction conferred to
the Tribunal as a whole, the Convention provides for the creation of a
Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber to settle a number of disputes related to ac-
tivities in the "Area" involving States, the Authority, prospective
contractors, a state enterprise, or a natural or juridical person. 0 This
Chamber was established for the first time in February 1997 with the
election of eleven ITLOS judges for three-year terms.3'
Beyond the mandatory creation of the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber,
the Tribunal was also required to constitute a Chamber of Summary
Procedure. It was further given the discretionary power to form special
chambers comprised of three judges to deal with specific categories of
disputes.32 Shortly after its inauguration, the Tribunal constituted two
standing special chambers, taking advantage of what it considered to be
the "specific expertise available within the Tribunal. 3 3 In October 1996,
the 21 elected judges set out to establish the structures necessary for the
Tribunal to play an important role in "the building of an international
society governed by the rule of law."34 As a result, the judges set up vari-
ous committees to "direct its internal organization,"3 1 which bore fruit in
the guise of various documents including the Tribunal's Rules of Proce-
dure, a Resolution on the Internal Judicial Practice of the Tribunal, and
Guidelines concerning the Preparation and Presentation of Cases before
the Tribunal 6 Further, the ITLOS consolidated its relationship within
29. See id. Annex VI, art. 22.
30. See id. Part XI, art. 187. The "Area" is the "sea-bed and ocean floor and subsoil
[...]beyond the limits of national jurisdiction." See id. Part I, art. 1, 1 (1).
31. Press Release, Int'l Trib. for the Law of the Sea, Judges of the Tribunal select the
Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber, the Chamber for the Marine Environment and the Chamber on
Fisheries Matters, U.N. Doc. ITLOS/Press 5 (March 3, 1997) at http://www.un.org/Depts/
los/Press/ITLOS/ITLOS-5.html. Note that under Article 36 of the ITLOS Statute, (LOS
CONVENTION, Annex VI) the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber may be authorized by State parties
to form additional ad hoc chambers consisting of three judges.
32. LOS CONVENTION, supra note 2, Annex VI, art. 15. The Chamber of Summary Pro-
cedure is manned by five judges who are elected for annual terms.
33. Press Release, supra note 31, at 2-4. The two standing chambers of the ITLOS are
the Chamber on Fisheries Matters and the Chamber on the Marine Environment.
34. Press Release, supra note 20, at I (quoting UN Secretary-General B. Boutros-
Ghali).
35. Press Release, Int'l Trib. for the Law of the Sea, Tribunal Readies Itself for Cases;
Prepared Draft Budget for 1998; and Sets up Committees, U.N. Doc. ITLOS/Press 6, at 2 (5
May 1997) at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/Press/ITLOS/ITLOS-6.html.
36. Press Release, Int'l Trib. for the Law of the Sea, Tribunal adopts its Rules of Procedure,
Resolution on its Internal Judicial Practice, and Guidelines to Assist Parties, U.N. Doc.
ITLOS/Press 7 (Nov. 3, 1997) at http://www.un.orglDeptslos/PressITLOSIITLOS-7.html. Note
that the judges used as a basis for drafting these legal instruments working documents prepared
Spring 2001 ]
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the UN system through the Agreement on Cooperation and Relationship
between the United Nations and the International Tribunal for the Law
of the Sea, thus becoming part "of the system of the peaceful settlement
of disputes laid down in the United Nations Charter."37
III. THE MIV SAIGA CASE
Within two weeks of having adopted the above-mentioned constitu-
tive instruments, including the Rules of Procedure, the Tribunal was
seized.38 On 13 November 1997, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines made
an application to the Tribunal instituting proceedings against Guinea,
asking that the ITLOS order the prompt release of MIV Saiga, a ship
flying its flag. In its application, Saint Vincent requested the submission
of the case to the Chamber of Summary Procedure. However, because
Guinea failed to notify the Tribunal within a five-day period that it was
willing to concur with such a request, the matter was sent to the Tribunal
as a whole, instead of one of its chambers.39
By virtue of the newly adopted Rules, the Tribunal had to hear the
parties within a period of ten days and to then deliver a judgment within
another ten-day period.4° As a result of a request by Guinea, the hearings
of 21 November 1997 were postponed for six days to "allow it to pre-
pare its case."4 ' Having spent 27 and 28 November hearing the case, the
Tribunal delivered its judgment on 4 December 1997, some twenty-one
days after having been seized of the matter. While the judgment was
unanimous in determining that the Tribunal had jurisdiction over the
application, it failed to muster a large majority beyond that point. The
Tribunal split 12 votes to 9 on all subsequent issues of the operative
by the International Seabed Authority and the ITLOS PREPCOM. See Rosenne, supra note
24, at 497.
37. Press Release, Int'l Trib. for the Law of the Sea, Relationship Agreement with
United Nations Enters into Force, U.N. Doc. ITLOS/Press 16 (Oct. 20, 1998) at
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/Press/ITLOS/ITLOS- I 6.html.
38. Press Release, Int'l Trib. for the Law of the Sea, The Tribunal Receives Application
for Prompt Release of a Vessel and its Crew, U.N. Doc. ITLOS/Press 8 (Nov. 13, 1997) at
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/Press/ITLOS/ITLOS-8.html.
39. See MV Saiga (St. Vincent and Grenadines v. Guinea) 1997 Int'l Trib. for the Law
of the Sea [ITLOS] 5 (Dec. 4) [hereinafter MIV Saiga Opinion, ITLOS (1997)] available at
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/ITLOS/Judgment-Saiga.htm. Note that the Tribunal rendered
judgment on the merits phases of this case on 1 July 1999.
40. Rules of the Tribunal, Oct. 28, 1997, art. 41(3), INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE
LAW OF THE SEA BASIC TEXTS (1998) [hereinafter RULES].
41. Press Release, Int'l Trib. for the Law of the Sea, Hearing in the MN Saiga Case Tri-
bunal Issues Order, U.N. Doc. ITLOS/Press 9 (Nov. 21, 1997) at http://www.un.org/
Depts/los/Press/ITLOS/ITLOS-9.html.
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provisions of the judgment.4 2 Not only were the dissenting judges criti-
cal of the majority's judgment, they went beyond simply expressing
their view as to what the law should have been.43 Mining the same vein,
Ken Roberts wrote: "A close examination [ ... ] raises serious questions
about the reasoning used by the majority to arrive at its decision." This
article's analysis will now turn to this judgment and to the primary dis-
senting opinion to establish a basis upon which to consider the influence
of the President of the Law of the Sea Tribunal. Having undertaken such
an examination, it will become clear the extent to which the head of the
Tribunal failed to ensure a well-reasoned judgment commanding a
strong majority and international respect.
A. The Judgment in the MIV Saiga Case
The Tribunal first determined that it had jurisdiction over the issue
by making reference to Article 292 of the LOS Convention entitled
"Prompt release of vessels and crews" which reads:
1. Where the authorities of a State Party have detained a vessel
flying the flag of another State Party and it is alleged that
the detaining State has not complied with the provisions of
this Convention for the prompt release of the vessel or its
crew upon the posting of a reasonable bond or other finan-
cial security, the question of release from detention may be
submitted to any court or tribunal agreed upon by the parties
or, failing such agreement within 10 days from the time of
detention, to a court or tribunal accepted by the detaining
State under article 287 or to the International Tribunal for
the Law of the Sea, unless the parties otherwise agree.
2. The application for release may be made only by or on be-
half of the flag State of the vessel.
42. Consider the following statement by dissenting judges who chose to go against the
judicial trend by voting for operative provisions on the merits en mass: "We vote against
operative paragraph 2 and the consequential paragraphs 3 to 5 of the Judgment for several
reasons." M/V Saiga (St. Vincent and Grenadines v. Guinea) 1997 Int'l Trib. for the Law of
the Sea [ITLOS] 1 (Dec. 4) [hereinafter M/V Saiga Dissent, ITLOS (1997)] (Vice-President
Wolfrum and Yamamoto, J., dissenting) available at http://www.un.orglDeptslos/ ITLOS/
Saiga-Discent Opin.htm#Wolfrum-Yamamoto:dissent.
43. See infra Part IV B, entitled "The Primary Dissenting Opinion in the MV Saiga
case."
44. Ken Roberts, The International Tribunalfor the Law of the Sea: Some Comments on
the MV Saiga Case, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea, 10 AFRICAN JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW 407, 414 (1998); see also Brown, supra note 1, at
325.
Spring 2001 ]
Michigan Journal of International Law
3. The court or tribunal shall deal without delay with the ap-
plication for release and shall deal only with the question of
release, without prejudice to the merits of any case before
the appropriate domestic forum against the vessel, its owner
or its crew. The authorities of the detaining State remain
competent to release the vessel or its crew at any time.
4. Upon the posting of the bond or other financial security de-
termined by the court or tribunal, the authorities of the
detaining State shall comply promptly with the decision of
the court or tribunal concerning the release of the vessel or
its crew.
The next issue to address was whether the application was
admissible. The Tribunal examined the circumstances surrounding the
arrest of the MV Saiga, a Geneva-registered oil tanker flying the flag of
Saint Vincent. The ship, at the time of the incident, was a "bunkering
vessel supplying oil to fishing vessels and other vessels operating off the
coast of Guinea.,,4' The day prior to arrest, the MV Saiga had supplied
oil to a number of shipping vessels within the 200 mile exclusive
economic zone (EEZ) of Guinea. The next day, on 28 October 1997, the
ship was arrested by Guinean officials outside its EEZ and brought to
port, where vessel and crew were detained.46 Despite these facts, as
determined by the judgment, Guinea had argued that the MV Saiga had
been bunkering in its 24 mile contiguous zone in violation of its
customs laws and that the arrest was justified as "detention had taken
place after the exercise of the right of hot pursuit in accordance with
Article 111 of the Convention. 47 Saint Vincent's retort was that Guinea
had no basis for arrest and failed to abide by its obligation, under Article
73(2) of the LOS Convention, whereby "arrested vessels and their crews
shall be promptly released upon the posting of reasonable bond or other
security.
'48
45. M/V Saiga Opinion, ITLOS (1997) 28.
46. Id. 1 30. Saint Vincent described the arrest in the following manner: the MN Saiga
was "attacked by representatives of the Guinean Government who shot at the ship and crew
and injured four of them before taking control of the vessel. The vessel was brought into
Conakry, Guinea at around 21:00 on 28 October 1997. Two seriously injured crew have since
been allowed to leave. The vessel and remaining crew continue to be held hostage at Cona-
kry." See Press Release, supra note 38, at 1.
47. MV Saiga Opinion, ITLOS (1997) 60.
48. LOS CONVENTION, supra note 2, art. 73 The article reads in full:
I. The coastal State may, in the exercise of its sovereign rights to explore,
exploit, conserve and manage the living resources in the exclusive eco-
nomic zone, take such measures, including boarding, inspection, arrest
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The judgment rendered by the Tribunal sought first to establish that
proceedings under Article 292 are separate from any other proceedings
before the ITLOS: "they are separate, independent proceedings."'9
Within the framework of the Article 292, proceedings are to be consid-
ered of an "accelerated nature"; thus the Tribunal deemed that its
standards for appreciating the claims of the parties would not' be the
same as those required on the merits. The basis of appreciation, the
judgment determined, was that of "assessing whether the allegations
made are arguable or are of sufficiently plausible character in the sense
that the Tribunal may rely upon them for the present purpose"5
The majority of the Tribunal then went on, proprio motu, to ask a
question:
[I]s bunkering (refueling) of a fishing vessel within the exclu-
sive economic zone of a State to be considered as an activity the
regulation of which falls within the scope of the exercise by the
coastal State of its "sovereign rights to explore, exploit, con-
serve and manage the living resources in the exclusive economic
zone?"'"
By answering its own question in the affirmative, the Tribunal
opened a second line of argument beyond that put forward by the Guin-
ean counsel during the proceedings. Thus the Tribunal was opening the
possibility, by characterizing bunkering as a fishing activity, of making
the Saint Vincent claim admissible because it then fell within the provi-
sions of Article 73(2) of the LOS Convention.
Why did the judgment seek to open this second line of argument
over the admissibility of the Guinean claim? The Tribunal found that the
Guinean "allegation based on the right of hot pursuit does not meet the
same requirements of arguability [sic] (or of being of a sufficiently
plausible character)" and, as a result, determined that "the arguments
and judicial proceedings, as may be necessary to ensure compliance with
the laws and regulations adopted by it in conformity with this Convention.
2. Arrested vessels and their crews shall be promptly released upon the post-
ing of reasonable bond or other security.
3. Coastal State penalties for violations of fisheries laws and regulations in
the exclusive economic zone may not include imprisonment, in the ab-
sence of agreements to the contrary by the States concerned, or any other
form of corporal punishment.
4. In cases of arrest or detention of foreign vessels the coastal State shall
promptly notify the flag State, through appropriate channels, of the action
taken and of any penalties subsequently imposed.
49. M/V Saiga Opinion, ITLOS (1997) 50.
50. Id.
51. Id. 56 (quoting LOS CONVENTION, supra note 2, art. 73(1)).
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put forward in order to support the existence of the requirements for hot
pursuit and, consequently, for justifying the arrest, are not tenable, even
prima facie."" Having found that the arguments furthered by Guinea
were not defensible, the judgment went on to characterize the bunkering
activities of the MV Saiga, not as an infraction of Guinean customs
laws, but of its laws regarding fishing activities within the EEZ. Thus,
the claim was admissible, in line with the arguments of Saint Vincent
under Article 73(2).
The judicial reasoning of the majority of the Tribunal is found in the
following two paragraphs:
In light of the independent character of the proceedings for the
prompt release of vessels and crews, when adopting its classifi-
cation of the laws of the detaining State, the Tribunal is not
bound by the classification given by such State. The Tribunal
can, on the basis of the arguments developed above, conclude
that, for the purposes of the present proceedings, the action of
Guinea can be seen within the framework of article 73 of the
Convention.
72. Why does the Tribunal prefer the classification connect-
ing these laws to article 73 of the Convention to that put forward
by the detaining State? The answer to this question is that the
classification as "customs" of the prohibition of bunkering of
fishing vessels makes it very arguable that [... ] the Guinean au-
thorities acted from the beginning in violation of international
law, while the classification under article 73 permits the as-
sumption that Guinea was convinced that in arresting the MN
Saiga it was acting within its rights under the Convention. It is
the opinion of the Tribunal that given the choice between a legal
classification that implies a violation of international law and
one that avoids such implication it must opt for the latter.
Having established the admissibility of the claim based on Article
73(2) of the LOS Convention, the Tribunal found that the allegations
made by Saint Vincent were well founded and decided that "Guinea
must release promptly the MN Saiga and the members of its crew cur-
rently detained or otherwise deprived of their liberty."53 The release,
however, was conditioned on the posting of a bond which the Tribunal
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ceedings. 54 Thus, the prompt release of the M/V Saiga and its crew took
place on the basis of securities in the form of the tanker's oil cargo and a
letter of credit or bank guarantee amounting to US $400,000.",
B. The Primary Dissenting Opinion in the MV Saiga Case
The nine judges who voted against the operative provisions of the
Tribunal's judgment expressed their views through four dissenting opin-
ions. Two opinions were delivered jointly: one on behalf of five judges,
another expressing the views of two judges; while the two final opinions
were the work of single authors.56 However, because of the willingness
of all of the dissenting judges to lend weight to the five judges' joint
dissenting opinion, the legal reasoning found in the dissent appears to be
supported by all nine judges. President Mensah states that, having read
the joint dissenting opinion, he agrees "with the opinion in every re-
spect."57 In a similar fashion, Vice-President Wolfrum and Judge
Yamamoto said that on "other points, not referred to in [our joint] Dis-
senting Opinion, we should like to associate ourselves with the thrust"58
of all the other dissenting opinions. Judge Anderson likewise associated
himself "generally with the thrust of the separate opinions," including
that of the five judges. 9
In delivering their dissenting opinion, Judges Park, Nelson,
Chandrasekhara Rao, Vukas, and Ndiaye sought to address specifically
the arguments put forward by Guinea and the reasoning of the Tribunal
which led to finding Saint Vincent's claim admissible. "There is no evi-
dence that the actions taken by the authorities of Guinea against the MV
Saiga were under the laws and regulations of Guinea concerning" the
items as enumerated in Article 73(2); that is, "the exploration, exploita-
tion, management and conservation of marine living resources or the
prevention of illegal fishing." The dissent continued:
The Respondent has from the very outset clearly and consis-
tently maintained that the M/V "Saiga" was arrested for the
offence of smuggling in the sense of illegally supplying oil to
fishing vessels in contravention of its customs legislation. In this
54. Id. 81.
55. Id. 185.
56. See generally, M/V Saiga, ITLOS (1997) I (Park, J., Nelson, J., Chandrasekhara
Rao, J., Vukas, J. and Ndiaye, J.; Vice-President Wolfrum, Yamamoto, J., Anderson, J.,
and President Mensah, dissenting), available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/ITLOS/
Saiga-Dissent.htm.
57. Id. 4 (President Mensah, dissenting).
58. Id. 26 (Vice-President Wolfrum and Yamamoto, J., dissenting).
59. Id. 14 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
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connection, it has emphasized the importance to its national
economy of customs revenue from petroleum products, which it
claims constitutes as much as thirty seven percent of its total na-
tional revenue.6°
While the joint dissent takes issue with the fact that Guinea failed to
provide any evidence that would substantiate a claim of bunkering as
being a violation of the sovereign rights of a coastal State in the EEZ
and thus admissible under Article 73(2) of the Convention, the Judges
also consider that Saint Vincent and the Grenadiers also failed to make a
case as to admissibility. In the words of the dissenters, "the Applicant
has not produced any evidence that the authorities of Guinea proceeded
against the vessel as part of an anti-bunkering operation to protect fish-
ing stocks in the EEZ of Guinea., 6' As a result, the five judges were
"unable to accept the request of the Applicant" and thus concluded that
"the Application filed by Saint Vincent and the Grenadines is not admis-
sible under Article 292 of the Convention."62
The joint dissent did not, however, stop there. It took issue with the
judgment, saying that Guinea had clearly shown in its arguments that it
had not acted under Article 73(2) when it arrested the M/V Saiga for
having committed customs offences. The dissenting judges went on to
say:
If the Respondent thought that its action was connected with the
enforcement of its customs law, its case before the court or tri-
bunal competent to hear the case on merits would stand or fall
on that basis. It is not for the Tribunal to find or postulate a pos-
sible justification for the action of the Respondent.63
The judges then consider the judicial reasoning of the majority of the
Tribunal, when they ask the question: "Why does the Tribunal prefer the
classification connecting these laws to Article 73 of the Convention to
that put forward by the detaining State?" 64 The Tribunal's willingness to
classify the actions of Guinea as falling within the ambit of Article 73
and not within customs law in order to avoid the implication of illegality
was seen by the joint dissent as being "totally unjustified" and "an un-
warranted evaluation of the legality of the Respondent's actions., 65 The
60. M/V Saiga Dissent, ITLOS (1997) 10 (Park, J., Nelson, J., Chandrasekhara Rao, J.,
Vukas, J., and Ndiaye, J. dissenting) (emphasis in the original).
61. Id. T 13.
62. Id. 26.
63. Id. 16 (emphasis added).
64. Id. TT 19-20.
65. Id. 1 20. D. J. Devine, summarizing the M/V Saiga case, wrote that it "is submitted
that this [the view of the majority as expressed in the judgment] is a rather strained interpreta-
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criticism of the dissenting judges on this issue deserves to be quoted in
full:
In our opinion, it is neither necessary nor appropriate for the
Tribunal to comment on the validity or otherwise of Guinean ac-
tions under international law or advise Guinea on how it might
defend its actions under international law. We cannot appear to
be better custodians of Guinean interests than Guinea itself.
Apart from the fact that this is not a role which properly belongs
to the Tribunal. We consider that it is totally unjustified to use
such an unwarranted evaluation of the legality of the Respon-
dent's actions as the basis for determining whether or not the
Applicant's allegation has been substantiated. It is illogical to
assume that, for the sake of avoiding the invocation of Article
292 of the Convention, the Respondent would undertake the risk
of endangering its position on the merits of the case to be ad-
judged later by the competent court or tribunal. Accordingly, we
conclude that the allegation of the Applicant that the Respon-
dent has failed to comply with Article 73 of the Convention is
not "well-founded." 66
Likewise, scholars have been critical of the judgment's willingness
to proffer an "alternative argument for preferring the classification con-
necting the relevant Guinea laws to Article 73 .67 E. D. Brown thought
such a characterization "extraordinary, 61 while Ken Roberts noted that
only "through the questionable arrogation of a power to recharacterize
the offence did the majority manage to find that the Application had
made a sufficiently plausible argument that the offence was related to
fisheries."69
IV. THE ROLE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE ITLOS
Having considered both the judgment and the primary dissent, it is
now time to investigate the role of the President of the Tribunal so as to
consider whether he might have played a more active role in attempting
to forge a greater majority for the first judgment in the Tribunal's
tion of the situation." See D. J. Devine, Prompt Release of Arrested Vessels and Their Crews, 28
SOUTH AFRICAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 274, 275 (1998).
66. See M/V Saiga Dissent, ITLOS (1997) $ 20 (Park, J., Nelson, J., Chandrasekhara
Rao, J., Vukas, J., and Ndiaye, J., dissenting).
67. Brown, supra note 1, at 323.
68. Id.
69. Roberts, supra note 44, at 421.
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history. The first President [of] the Tribunal, Thomas A. Mensah, was
elected on 1 October 1996 for a mandate of three years. Like the
President of the International Court of Justice, the Office of the
President comprises three main areas of responsibility.0 As presiding
judge of the Tribunal, the President has various judicial functions when
the ITLOS is seized of a matter. The President, as head of the ITLOS,
also has the administrative function of ensuring the smooth functioning
of the Tribunal at large. Finally, the President is the Tribunal's
representative at the international level and thus undertakes both
ceremonial and diplomatic functions. These functions of the President
are noted, somewhat cryptically, in Article 12 of the Rules of the
Tribunal, which prescribes:
1) The President of the Tribunal shall preside at all meetings of
the Tribunal. He shall direct the work and supervise the ad-
ministration of the Tribunal; and
2) He shall represent the Tribunal in its relations with States
and other entities.
A. The Administrative and Representative
Roles of the President
Beyond his judicial functions, which will be considered shortly, the
President must supervise the administrative affairs of the Tribunal and
assume both ceremonial and diplomatic functions as its outside
representative. The primary administrative duties of the President relate
to ensuring the proper administration of the judicial arm of the Tribunal.
The President is mandated with the responsibility of ensuring that a full
Tribunal is always at the disposal of the Parties to the LOS Convention.
This is accomplished by requiring judges to "hold themselves
permanently available to exercise their functions," and it is to the
President that they must duly explain situations of absence based on
"illness or for other serious reasons."7' The administration of the
Tribunal further requires the President receive letters of resignation from
both members of the Tribunal and judges ad hoc.72 In situations where
issues of judicial independence or conflict of interest arise which
prevent the judge from "fulfill[ing] the required conditions," it is the
responsibility of the President, after having heard from that judge and
70. See Charles Sirat, Le President de la Cour internationale de Justice [The President
of the International Court of Justice], 62 REVUE G9NI9RALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL
PUBLIC 193 (1958).
71. See RULES, supra note 40, art. 41(3).
72. Id. arts. 6,8, at 18-19.
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with the consent of the Tribunal, to "declare the seat vacant."73 When
vacancies occur, the President should set a date when the Parties to the
LOS Convention are to hold new elections.74
As the Tribunal's "representative in its relations with States and other
entities," the President is called upon to meet and host dignitaries of the
United Nations and of the host State, as well as representatives from State
Parties, prospective States Parties, and international organizations. As for
his diplomatic functions, the President gives presentations before the
States Parties to the LOS Convention as well as before the UN General
Assembly. He further heads negotiations on behalf of the Tribunal. In his
role as a negotiator thus far, the President has been responsible for various
agreements, including a Headquarters Agreement and an Agreement on
the Privileges and Immunities of the International Tribunal for the Law
of the Sea with the German Government. The President has also helped
conclude an Agreement on Cooperation and Relationship between the
United Nations and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea.75
B. The Judicial Role of the President
By virtue of Article 26 of the Statute of the ITLOS, all hearings of
the Tribunal should be conducted "under the control of the President. 76
The Rules of the Tribunal attribute a primary role to the President in all
facets of a case from its infancy, when he is given the possibility of
summoning the agents of the Parties to consider issues of procedure.
77
While the Tribunal has responsibility for making orders regarding the
filing of pleadings and the setting of time-limits for written proceedings,
73. LOS CONVENTION, supra note 2, Annex VI, art. 9. Additionally, Annex VI, art. 7 de-
tails incompatible activities, and Annex VI, art. 8 outlines the conditions relating to
participation of members in a particular case. Note also Article 22(4) of the Rules, which
deals with ad hoc judges selected by an entity other than a State and which reads: "Where
two or more judges on the bench are nationals of member States of the international organi-
zation concerned or of the sponsoring States of a Party, the President may, after consulting
the Parties, request one or more of such judges to withdraw from the bench." See RULES,
supra note 40, art. 22(4).
74. Id. Annex VI, art. 6. Beyond the calling of elections for new members, the President
plays a major role in the selection of judges for chambers of the Tribunal. While the Tribunal
as a body selects the judges of the Chamber of Summary Procedure, of the Seabed Disputes
Chamber, and of any special chambers, this is done on the basis of proposals put to them by
the President, which in practice have been accepted by consensus. See generally, Press Re-
lease, supra note 31, at 1.
75. See Press Release, supra note 37.
76. This role is, of course, qualified by the fact that the President of the Tribunal may be
disqualified from presiding over a hearing by virtue of nationality or previous interest in a
case, in which case it is left to the Vice-President to do so, or, if the Vice-President is also
disqualified, to the most senior judge. See LOS CONVENTION, supra note 2, Annex VI, art. 8;
RULES, supra note 40, art. 13 3.
77. See RULES, supra note 40, art. 45.
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those orders are made with regard to the views of the parties as ascer-
tained by the President.78 Upon the closure of the written phase, each
judge is required to prepare a written note identifying the principal is-
sues which have emerged and the points which appear to need
clarification during the oral proceedings. Based on these notes, respon-
sibility falls to the President to draft a working paper to summarize the
facts of the case, the contentions of the parties, and to make proposals as
to the questions that are to be asked of the Parties and the evidence to be
provided.79 Further, the working paper is to include the "issues which, in
the opinion of the President, should be discussed and decided by the
Tribunal" in its private deliberations.0
At the President's discretion, the Tribunal must deliberate before
and may, at its discretion, deliberate during the oral proceedings on the
basis of the President's working paper.8 During the public sitting of the
oral phase, the President is the gateway by which other judges are to put
questions to the parties, witnesses, or experts. In light of those hear-
ings, it is left to the President to revise his working paper when it
appears appropriate in awaiting the further deliberations. The initial de-
liberations after the close of oral proceedings are meant to reach
conclusions on "what are the issues which need to be decided and then
[to hear] the tentative opinions of the judges on those issues. 83 It falls to
the President to lead the discussion calling on the judges to speak in the
order in which they have requested the floor and to seek out a majority
opinion on each issue. Having ascertained the opinions of the judges,
78. See id. art. 59. With respect to the written proceedings, errors in any of the filed
documents may be corrected with the consent of the Parties or "by leave of the President."
See id. art. 65. Further, under the Guidelines concerning the Preparation and Presentation of
Cases before the Tribunal, if the Registrar deems it necessary, he is to consult the President
in situations where the written pleadings of either Party does not "satisfy the formal require-
ments of the Rules." See Guidelines Concerning the Preparation and Presentation of Cases
before the Tribunal, Oct. 28, 1997 11, INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW OF THE
SEA BASIC TEXTS (1998) [hereinafter GUIDELINES].
79. See Resolution on Internal Judicial Practice, Oct. 31, 1997, art. 2, INTERNATIONAL
TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA BASIC TEXTS (1998) [hereinafter INTERNAL JUDICIAL
PRACTICE].
80. Id.
81. See id. arts. 3, 4.
82. See RULES, supra note 40, art. 76(3) ("Each judge has a similar right to put ques-
tions, but before exercising it he should make his intention known to the President of the
Tribunal."). See also id. art. 80. ("Witnesses and experts shall, under the control of the Presi-
dent of the Tribunal, be examined by the agents, counsel or advocates of the parties starting
with the party calling the witness or expert. Questions may be put to them by the President of
the Tribunal and by the judges.").
83. See INTERNAL JUDICIAL PRACTICE, supra note 79, art. 5.
84. The judges may, instead of establishing majority opinions, "decide that every judge
should prepare a brief written note, expressing the judge's tentative opinion on the issues and
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the President proposes to the Tribunal the name of five judges who
clearly support the majority view to form a Drafting Committee.
The Drafting Committee prepares a draft judgment which is to be
considered by the judges, first individually, then in deliberations where
the draft is examined at a first reading. During the first reading, the draft
may be modified by amendments proposed by the judges. It is at this
stage that judges who wish to append separate or dissenting opinions
will inform their brethren and provide an outline of their opinion." After
the Committee has revised its draft judgment, a second reading occurs
during which time the President asks if any of the judges "wish to
propose new amendments."86 Having finalized the judgment and
received the separate and dissenting opinions, the Tribunal votes to
establish a majority as required by Article 29 of its Statute. By inverse
order of seniority, the judges are called upon to adopt the judgment "by
means solely of an affirmative or a negative vote. 87 In situations where
votes for and against various sections of the deposit if [they] are equal,
the President casts the deciding vote.88 The judgment is then to be
authenticated by the signature of the President and the Registrar.
The above description lays out the judicial role of the President of
the ITLOS in normal circumstances. The role of the President may,
however, be modified in manners which increase the breadth of his ac-
tivities or reduce his judicial role. The President's role within the legal
framework of the Tribunal may be expanded by the fact that the Rules
vest a-number of duties, which are in actuality attributed to all judges, in
the President when the Tribunal is not sitting.9° The fact that the ITLOS
is a judicial organ which does not sit permanently means that, in reality,
some of the powers vested in the Tribunal will often be applied by the
President. The provisions of the Tribunal's Rules call on the "Tribunal,
the correct disposal of the case, for circulation to the other judges before a specified date.
The Tribunal resumes its deliberations as soon as possible on the basis of the written notes."
See id. art. 5(7).
85. See id. art. 8.
86. See id. art. 8(5).
87. See id. art. 9(1) which reads:
After the Tribunal has completed its second reading of the draft judgment, the
President takes the vote in accordance with article 29 of the Statute in order to
adopt the judgment. A separate vote is normally taken on each operative provision
in the judgment. Any judge may request a separate vote on issues which are sepa-
rable. Each judge votes by means solely of an affirmative or a negative vote, cast
in person and in inverse order of seniority: provided that in exceptional circum-
stances accepted by the Tribunal an absent judge may vote by appropriate means
of communications.
88. See LOS CONVENTION, supra note 2, Annex VI, art. 29.
89. Id. Annex VI, art. 30; see also RULES, supra note 40, art. 125(3).
90. Id.
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or [...] the President of the Tribunal if the Tribunal is not sitting," to
undertake judicial functions mostly in the realm of setting time-limits. 9'
The President's role within the ITLOS is further increased in that he is
an ex officio member of both the Chamber of Summary Procedure and
the judicial Drafting Committee, which is called upon to prepare the
Tribunal's judgments. 9'
Beyond the aforementioned provisions enhancing the role the Presi-
dent within the ITLOS, his powers may be modified by a requirement to
forego his judicial role as President. Such a situation may arise when it
appears that the President, as may be the case for any other member of
the Tribunal, has previously been involved with either party with respect
to the issue under consideration in a particular case. When a conflict of
interest arises, or when the President "for some special reason deter-
mines that he should not take part in the case, his judicial role is
nullified."93
Beyond being excluded from a case, in situations where the Presi-
dent does not share the opinion of the majority during the deliberations
after the oral proceedings, he retains his non-judicial duties, 94 but his
judicial role is modified; he becomes, for a crucial period of time, a
judge on par with his colleagues. While the President is an ex officio
member of the Drafting Committee, if he does not share the opinion of
the majority, he foregoes the right to collaborate in the production of the
original draft judgment. The relevant provision of the Resolution on In-
ternal Judicial Practice reads:
The President is a member ex officio of the Committee unless
the President does not share the opinion of the majority as it
appears then to exist, in which case the Vice-President acts
instead. If the Vice-President is ineligible for the same reason,
all the members of the Committee are selected by the Tribunal. 9
Further, the President forgoes his normal role of introducing the
draft and of chairing the examination of the draft through its first read-
91. RULES, supra note 40, arts. 59, 67, 84, 90, 96, 112. The President also has powers,
when the Tribunal is not sitting, regarding intervention of third parties, id. arts. 101, 104;
discontinuance, id. art. 105; requests for revision of judgments, id. art. 128; and Advisory
Opinions, id. art. 133.
92. See id. art. 28.
93. See LOS CONVENTION, supra note 2, Annex VI, art. 8.
94. See Rules, supra note 40, art. 13(2) ("When the President of the Tribunal is pre-
cluded by a provision of the Statute or of these Rules either from sitting or from presiding in
a particular case, he shall continue to exercise the functions of the presidency for all pur-
poses save in respect of that case.").
95. See INTERNAL JUDICIAL PRACTICE, supra note 79, art. 6(2).
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ing.96 The President only regains his usual roles in the deliberations of
the Tribunal during the second reading, when the various judges have
already staked out their positions by informing the Tribunal of their
wish to deliver separate and dissenting opinions. At this point, the Presi-
dent is to ask if any of the judges wish to propose new amendments; if
not, the Tribunal moves to a vote on the judgment over which the Presi-
dent presides. 97
V. ANATOMY OF FAILED JUDICIAL LEADERSHIP
The MV Saiga case, like all other cases dealt with on the interna-
tional level, is to be considered important not only for the specifics of
the case decided but also, generally, for the evolution of international
law. In large part, this is due to the fact that the international commu-
nity:
[I]s peculiarly dependent on its international tribunals for the
development and clarification of the law, and for lending to it an
authority more substantial and less precarious than can be
drawn from often divergent or uncertain practices of states, or
even from the opinions of individual publicists whatever their
reputation. 98
Beyond the authority vested in each international judicial pro-
nouncement, the fact that the prompt release of the MV Saiga was the
first case determined by ITLOS is of added significance, for it sets the
tone for future decisions of the Tribunal. As Judge Weeramantry of the
ICJ noted in a public address:
It is incontrovertible fact that a decision choosing one of two or
more alternative courses equally available to the judge has an
impact upon the understanding of the law in the future, whether
by the judge, the lawyer or, indeed, by the public. Especially if
it is an important or path-finding decision, the living law is not
the same thereafter. The judge has become the instrument of
change through which the process of adaptation takes place to
the needs of the time. Decisions piled upon decisions thus make
96. See id. art. 8.
97. See id. art. 9(1).
98. Oscar Schachter, Creativity and Objectivity in International Tribunals, VOLKER-
RECHT ALS RECHTSORDNUNG INTERNATIONALE GERICHTSBARKEIT MENSCHENRECHTE:
FESTSCHRIFT FUR HERMANN MOSLER 813, 815 (Rudolf Bernhardt et al. eds. 1983) (quoting
Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, Hersch Lauterprect-the Scholar as Judge, 37 B.Y.I.L. 1, 19 (1961)).
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a whole corpus of law, whether or not the process be prohibited
by state authority or settled by tradition.99
There was a need to ensure that this case, above all others, com-
mands the respect of the international community. It has been noted that
"the trick is to build a sufficiently high-profile caseload at the outset to
attract a steady stream of claimants."' '° Yet the MIV Saiga judgment
failed in its reasoning and in its ability to forge a strong majority re-
quired to garner the respect of the State Parties to the LOS
Convention.'"' The failure of the Tribunal in the instant case must fall to
the President of the Tribunal, who should shoulder most of the criticism
that emerges from this case. Through the abrogation of his duties during
deliberations and his failure to forge a strong majority, the President
placed in peril the evolution and future legitimacy of the International
Tribunal on the Law of the Sea.
The inadequacies of the MAV Saiga case can be laid at the feet of
President Mensah, as it is at his office that the ultimate responsibility for
the success or failure of the Tribunal is found. The President, as primus
inter pares, has a governance role to play in the Tribunal; he is responsi-
ble for guiding its evolution, and for establishing and maintaining the
prestige required of an international judicial organ. The overarching re-
sponsibilities of the President of the ITLOS are akin to those of Manly
0. Hudson when he wrote that the President of the Permanent Court of
International Justice:
[I]s far more than the director of the public proceedings devoted
to hearing agents or counsel appearing in cases before the
Court. He is the guardian of the strictly judicial tradition of the
Court. Upon him falls the delicate task of threading the delib-
erations of the judges to conclusions which will command the
world's assent.'
0 2
Since the Tribunal's Statute, Rules, and the Resolution on Internal
Judicial Practice were based on the constitutive instruments of the Inter-
99. Christopher Weeramantry, The Function of the International Court of Justice in the
Development of International Law, 10 LEIDEN J. OF INT'L L. 309, 313 (1997).
100. Laurence R. Heifer and Anne-Marie Slaughter, Towards a Theory of Effective Su-
pranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L. J. 273, 301 (1997). See also Bruno De Witte, Retour
a Costa: La primautd du droit communautaire a la lumidre du droit international, 20 REVUE
TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT EUROPIEN 425, 427 (1984).
101. As Mohammed Bedjaoui, former President of the International Court stated, "The
closer the Court comes to unanimity, the more the world will respect its authority." Moham-
med Bedjaoui, The 'Manufacture' of Judgments at the International Court of Justice, 3 PACE
Y.B. OF INT'L L. 29, 54 (1991).
102. Sir Percy Spender, The Office of President of the International Court of Justice, I
THE AUSTRALIAN Y.B. OF INT'L L. 9, 14 (1965) (emphasis in the original).
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national Court of Justice, it is not a great leap to say that the President
of the ITLOS, like his counterpart in the ICJ, holds a position which is
"clearly one of dominance in the work of the Court."' 3 Yet the presiding
judge of any international judicial organ has a responsibility to use this
dominance to ensure the well-being of that institution. As President of
the ICJ, Sir Percy Spender wrote that "[h]e [the President] must not bow
to their [individual judges] wishes, not even to those of a majority, when
he considers the interests of the Court demand otherwise, save only
where the Statute and Rules of Court stipulate expressly that a decision
of the Court is required."' '°
In the MV Saiga case, the President of the Tribunal failed to use
this authority and power in attempting to forge a judgment worthy of
respect. In so doing he abrogated his ultimate responsibility of ensuring
a viable International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea.
A. Seeking the Greatest Majority
Renowned British international legal scholar James L. Brierly
postulated that "the act of the Court is a creative act in spite of our
conspiracy to represent it as something else."'0 5 In quoting those words,
Oscar Schachter goes on to state that the "comment of Brierly reminds
us how reluctant international lawyers have been to recognize that
judges perform a creative role through their decisions and pronounce-
ments."' ° This aversion to acknowledging the role that judges play in the
creation of law has recently been tackled head-on by Judge Weeraman-
try of the International Court of Justice. In an opening lecture to
international law students at Leiden University, Judge Weeramantry
stated that there was a "widely shared belief that it is not the function of
judges to make law and that therefore judges should not make law. I
shall give you a number of reasons showing that judges do in fact make
law in all systems. ' 7 Accepting the premise that judges do not some
how "discover" law but do, in fact, make it allows one to consider the
internal judicial process and the impact that the President of the ITLOS
might have had on the outcome of the deliberations and ultimately the
MV Saiga Judgment.
When the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice
was being drafted at The Hague in 1920, the members of the Advisory
103. Id.
104. Id. at 15.
105. Schachter, supra note 98, at 814.
106. Id. at 813.
107. Weeramantry, supra note 99, at 312 (listing twelve different means by which
judges create law).
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Committee of Jurists thought "it would be dangerous to make the presi-
dency of the Court 'too important'. The President should be 'only'
primus inter pares."'0 ' Yet, as Shabtai Rosenne has noted, developments
since that time "have shown that this might be appropriate for adminis-
trative functions of the President. However, it is not an adequate or
proper description of the President's role or functions in the conduct of
judicial proceedings."' 9 In fact, Rosenne believes that the ultimate aim
of every President should be to produce a judgment that carries the
greatest majority:
He faces a major challenge in forging the largest possible
majority for any decision the Court may take be it interlocutory
or dispositive. In instances of high political tension, this is no
easy matter. It is through this that the office of the President has
attained its great prestige."'
B. The Drafting Committee
During the deliberations over prompt release, the President of the
ITLOS was never truly in a position to forge a large majority. At the
point of forming the Drafting Committee, he "did not share the opinion
of the majority.""' By excluding himself from the Committee, the judg-
ment would be drafted without "the guardian of the strictly judicial
tradition" of the Tribunal."2 Yet, the President should have led the Draft-
ing Committee despite his views. The ability to forge a judgment which
could have commanded a large majority and been well reasoned would
then have been within in his grasp; to not even have attempted it demon-
strated a lack of leadership. Understanding that a judgment "does not so
much represent the joint opinion of the judges as the common denomi-
nator of their divergent views," much room would have been available to
attempt to accommodate most views within a strong majority.' 3 During
the deliberations for this case, the President should have placed his per-
108. Shabtai Rosenne, The President of the International Court of Justice, FIFTY YEARS




111. The Vice-President of the Tribunal, Judge Rudiger Wolfrum, who likewise would
have had an institutional interest in assuming control over the drafting of the Judgment, also
did not share the view of the majority and was thus excluded from the Drafting Committee,
although he too was an ex officio member of it.
112. See Spender, supra note 102, at 14.
113. SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT,
1920-1996 1626 (vol. 3 1997); Bedjaoui argues that "the reasoning of any judgment of the
Court is merely the highest common denominator of the Judges' views." See Bedjaoui supra
note 101, at 59.
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sonal inclinations aside and sought to establish a judgment worthy of
respect as authoritative. Despite disagreeing with those who ultimately
ended up in the majority, the President, had he led the Drafting Commit-
tee, would have had many opportunities to influence the outcome of the
deliberations.' 4 With the judges apparently split on the admissibility of
the application, the mediation of the President would have been crucial
to a favorable outcome. Judge Bedjaoui, in a stimulating article entitled,
The "Manufacture" of Judgments at the International Court of Justice,
wrote, "it is the concern and duty of every Drafting Committee to win
the maximum possible number of votes for the main arguments of the
judgment.""'
At the International Court of Justice, seeking the maximum possible
number of votes has been the rule rather than the exception where:
[A]s a whole it is noticeable that many decisions have been
reached with sizeable majorities, if not with virtual unanimity.
This indicates that sparingness of words and reasons has en-
abled the Court to reach a number of important decisions with
almost or complete unanimity, a remarkable achievement con-
sidering the relative breakdown in its homogeneity." 1
6
Judge Bedjaoui described how the International Court of Justice has
managed to establish these sizable majorities. It is up to the Drafting
Committee to "anticipate and simplify":
In the first place, we anticipate the division which may eventu-
ally take place, for it is as yet too early to speak of dissent. Let
us rather put it this way, that in the course of the deliberation a
certain minority trend or trends will come to light. In principle,
nobody is committed to a definite role until the final vote, which
is still a long way off. And we simplify, since the questions dealt
with and the points of law considered in the reasoning worked
out by the Committee are always complex. Whatever agreement
or disagreement the preliminary draft may arouse in each Judge
will therefore always be subject to nuances [.. .] . It is quite
conceivable that a Judge may share the views of the Committee
on three-quarters of its reasoning, and it would not be right for
his disagreement on the remaining quarter to be allowed to
114. Had the President's attempt failed, he would not have been bound to vote with the
majority, though, as "the practice of international tribunals shows, it sometimes happens that
a member of a tribunal votes in favour of a decision of the tribunal even though he might
individually have been inclined to prefer another solution." See Arbitral Award of 31 July
1989 (Guinea-Bissau v. Sen.) 1991 I.C.J. 64 33 (Nov. 12).
115. Bedjaoui, supra note 101, at 52.
116. Rosenne, supra note 113, at 1626.
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obliterate his right, and indeed his duty, to join in the betterment
of the text."7
Further, the Drafting Committee has a responsibility to take into
consideration the inclinations of a judge who, although appearing to
lean towards the dissent, might, with modifications to the draft, be will-
ing to join the Judgment's majority. Thus, dissenting judges may
"succeed in having the judgment redrafted more in tune with their own
opinion of the case, which may allow them eventually to vote in favor or
even win over converts from the other camp."' 18
During the deliberations over prompt release in the MV Saiga case,
the President of the Tribunal effectively took himself out of the most
crucial part of the deliberations. He thus abdicated his duty, as guardian
of the judicial tradition, of ensuring a well-reasoned judgment able to
muster a strong majority. The influence of the Drafting Committee can-
not be overemphasized. Its ability to frame the issues under
consideration and to make decisions about what is to be included in the
deliberations has a great impact on deliberations and, decisively, on the
judgment. Judge Bedjaoui writes that the Drafting Committee of the ICJ
will always "table a compromise text," and that:
The delicacy of this operation cannot be overstated. If, for the
sake of votes, you try to please everyone, you finally satisfy no-
one and see your majority evaporate; hence, there is a point be-
yond which it is futile to persist in your effort to increase the
majority. On the other hand, if you wish the Judgment to make
an impact and strengthen the case law of the Court, you must
always persevere until that maximum point is reached."9
Thus, in the final analysis, the President, instead of being central to the
deliberations, became a bit player, ultimately harming the authoritative
nature of the Tribunal's pronouncements in the MV Saiga case.
C. Time Element and the Lack of a House Style
What may mitigate the failings of the written judgment in the MV
Saiga case is the limited time period in which the Tribunal was called
upon to deliver its first judgment. It will be remembered that by virtue
of Article 4(3) of the Statute, the States Parties should have held the first
election of judges on 16 May 1995, but they decided that this election
should be deferred until 1 August 1996. The judges held their first meet-
117. Bedjaoui, supra note 101, at 51-52.
118. Id. at51.
119. Id. at 54.
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ing two months later, on 1 October 1996. Before the application by St.
Vincent for the prompt release of the M/V Saiga, the Tribunal had met
on four occasions to ready itself to hear cases. The judges met over the
months of October 1996, February 1997, April 1997, September 1997
and October 1997. As a press release from the Tribunal dated 3 Novem-
ber 1997 reads, "one year after the International Tribunal for the Law of
the Sea was constituted and its inauguration celebrated, the Tribunal
completed its judicial organization.""'2 Thus, having adopted inter alia,
the Rules of the Tribunal and the Resolution on Internal Judicial Prac-
tice, the 21 judges scattered to the various ends of the earth only to be
summoned back to Hamburg less than a fortnight later, on 13 November,
when St. Vincent made its application.'2 ' Under the Rules of the Tribu-
nal, a judgment regarding a request for prompt release should occur
within days after application receipt. The Tribunal gave Guinea a six-
day postponement for the MV Saiga application and as a result, ren-
dered its judgment on 4 December 1997. Thus, within a 14-month
period, the Tribunal went from being solely an entity on paper to one
rendering binding judgments on the issue of prompt release.
The fact that this ad hoc adjudicative organ was called upon so early
in its history to address an issue as pressing as prompt release in an ex-
pedited fashion meant that only through strong leadership could a well-
reasoned judgment have emerged. The fact that the ITLOS judges do not
sit on a full-time basis means that no true judicial culture can emerge
permitting the development of a common understanding of the role of
the Tribunal vis-A-vis the Law of the Sea Convention. As former Presi-
dent of the International Court of Justice, Sir Robert Jennings relates,
the interaction between ICJ judges is essential to establishing a strong
judicial culture:
[A]ll judges have chambers next to or within easy reach of each
other, in which the corridors and landings are such that the mem-
bers inescapably see and meet each other probably several times a
day, and where there is a clubbable tradition by which members
tend to be constantly in and out of each other's chambers. Thus
120. Press Release, supra note 36, at 1.
121. The Tribunal relied "heavily" on the Resolution on the Internal Judicial Practice
when deliberating about prompt release. As President Mensah noted, "apart from shortening
the time-limits, the Tribunal took great care to follow the spirit of the Resolution as scrupu-
lously as the circumstances permitted." Letter from Thomas A. Mensah, President, Int'l
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (Aug. 5, 1999) (on file with author).
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the atmosphere encouraging relates and informal exchange and
discussion of ideas.'
22
Judge Bedjaoui, likewise, gives us insight into the 'behind the
scenes' interaction between ICJ judges:
In fact, it has become somewhat of an institution for the Judges
informally to put their heads together when tea-time arrives,
which it does at around three o'clock in the afternoon, since
everything bar the summer is precocious in Holland. It is then
customary for such judges who so desire to offer each other bis-
cuits and arguments in the first-floor lounge of their building.
They regain their offices, or accompany a colleague to his, or re-
main chatting in the corridor, imbued with the passing illusion
of having convinced the others of a point, or with an anxious
sense of having treated some aspect too lightly. Tea-time at the
Court, no less than in the Security Council, has thus become a
standing institution which nobody is obliged to frequent but
which has its habitues, its occasional patrons and its outsiders,
its heightened exchanges and its dying falls.
2 3
Ultimately, such interaction between the ICJ judges produces visible
results on the drafting and rendering of a judgment. As Judge Bedjaoui
noted, "one may add that after a certain experience of the Court, each
judge tends, by a subtle osmosis, to absorb the house style."' 24
Yet, the ad hoc nature of the Law of the Sea Tribunal is not condu-
cive to the establishment of its own unique style. Especially in situations
where determinations have to be made promptly after release, judges
have very little time to deliberate, preventing an opportunity to forge a
consensus.'2 While the limited time between the establishment of the
122. Sir Robert Jennings, The Internal Judicial Practice of the International Court of
Justice, 59 THE BRIT. Y.B. OF INT'L L. 31, 38 (1988).
123. Bedjaoui, supra note 101, at 47.
124. Id. at 50.
125. Consider the following statement from President Mensah:
In my view it is neither easy, nor indeed particularly helpful, to speculate on the
reasons for the difference of opinion between the majority of the Tribunal and the
dissenting minority on the question whether the application was admissible in
terms of Article 292 of the Convention. There is some evidence that the ap-
proaches adopted by the two groups resulted from a real difference in their
appreciation of the nature of the issue to be determined in the case, it is, of course,
possible that a longer period of discussion might have narrowed the gap or even
brought a consensus, but there is no way one can tell whether and, and if so, to
what extent this is true. [... ] Accordingly, I do not believe it is safe to assume that
a longer period of deliberations would necessarily have resulted in unanimity or
near-unanimity among the Judges. In this connection, I think it is important to
bear in mind that, while unanimous decisions of judicial bodies are on the whole
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ITLOS and the rendering of its first judgment in the MIV Saiga case
may thus be seen as a mitigating factor with respect to the failings of the
judgment, it does not absolve the President from his failure to lead the
Tribunal during this episode.
CONCLUSION
This study has sought to demonstrate that if an international adjudi-
cative organ is to garner respect for the rule of law internationally, it
must be able to forge authoritative decisions. The MV Saiga case dem-
onstrates clearly that the President of such a body plays a crucial role in
ensuring the authoritative nature of pronouncements. As gatekeeper of
the evolution and legacy of the International Tribunal for the Law of
Sea, President Mensah failed by not taking the lead during deliberations,
and by not attempting to establish a well-reasoned judgment worthy of
support from a solid majority. It has been shown that, as primus inter
pares, the President had the ability to influence process of deliberation,
but in this case did not. That the President excluded himself from the
Drafting Committee means, in essence, that on its maiden voyage, the
ITLOS was put to sea rudderless.
Moreover, the inability of the Law of the Sea Tribunal to make clear
pronouncements on the law governing prompt release reflects badly
upon it. As States are left with the option of choosing which means of
dispute settlement they may invoke in situations of dispute over the in-
terpretation or application of the Law of the Sea Convention, the
Tribunal may find itself overlooked at the expense of the other available
fora. 2 6 By permitting the rendering of a judgment "disappointing in
quality and marred by serious error,"'27 the President of the Tribunal
demonstrated a lack of leadership, limiting the effectiveness of the rule
of law on the international level.
to be desired, it is not realistic to expect that a Tribunal of twenty-one Judges will
often reach unanimity on important issues of law argued before it.
See Letter, supra note 121.
126. See LOS CONVENTION, supra note 2, art. 287.
127. Brown, supra note 1, at 325.
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